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 The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was predictably short, as Russian military might quickly trumped Georgian nationalist enthusiasm� Beyond its 
momentous geopolitical implications, it was the first war in which cyber activi-
ties loomed large; the conflict marked the public birth of “cyber war,” or at least 
cyber in war�1 
Cyber operations were not a completely new phenomenon� Most notably, they 
had played a significant geopolitical role in the previous year, when “hacktivists” 
around the world directed malicious cyber operations at NATO member Estonia 
following its transfer of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the Great Patriotic 
War from central Tallinn to the outskirts of the capital�2 But this was not “war” 
in the traditional sense of two or more states engaged in armed hostilities against 
each other� In the Georgian case, by contrast, the cyber activities took place on 
belligerent territory during an armed conflict that involved classic kinetic mili-
tary operations� Although civilians launched most of the attacks, and while they 
caused no physical damage or injury, there is no question that, unlike the events 
in Estonia, international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the law of war, 
law of armed conflict, and jus in bello) applied�
Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not 
just for cyber-empowered militaries such as that of the United States, but also for 
low-tech forces� Terrorist and insurgent groups benefit from the use of the Inter-
net to recruit fighters and to finance operations� Social media are exploited for 
purposes that range from passing targeting information to directing the deploy-
ment of forces (the insurgent “flash mob”)� Mobile phones are as much part of 
the twenty-first-century kit bag as weapons, and e-mail and texting have become 
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pervasive means of military communication� The Arab Spring was a watershed 
in this regard, and cyber operations are ongoing in the conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria� It is quite simply unimaginable that a contemporary conflict would not in-
volve some manner of cyber operations, whether as simple as passing intelligence 
information using smartphones or as complicated as bringing down the enemy’s 
integrated air-defense system�
In light of the role that cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts, 
attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities—to borrow a sports 
analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually going to 
lose, even if it is the better team� International law, and particularly IHL, exerts a 
powerful influence on tactics, operational planning, and strategic decision mak-
ing in modern warfare� The fight can be won on the battlefield but lost in the 
court of public and international opinion when one side appears to have acted 
outside the law� Given the novelty of cyber operations as a method of warfare 
during an armed conflict, any alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, has the 
potential for strategic consequences� 
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn, 
Estonia, has taken the global lead in addressing this issue� In 2009 it launched a 
three-year project to examine the application of international law, especially that 
governing the use of force, to cyber operations� Over twenty distinguished legal 
scholars and government legal advisers came together to produce the Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a resource cur-
rently being expanded in the Centre’s “Tallinn 2�0” project�3
Informed by the Tallinn Manual process, in which the author served as di-
rector, this article examines IHL’s core norms—those governing targeting—as 
applied to cyber operations� It does so by following the legal logic applicable to 
virtually every targeting operation, from naval gunfire and air attack to special-
forces operations and space attacks�4 In each such case, those who plan, approve, 
and execute targeting missions have to ask the following questions:
• What law applies to my operation?
• May I engage the intended target?
• Is the weapon I want to use legal?
• What precautions must I take to avoid collateral damage?
• Do the scope and degree of likely collateral damage prohibit me from 
engaging the target?
There is now widespread agreement that international humanitarian law ap-
plies in its entirety to cyber operations conducted during an armed conflict�5 
Thus, the questions set out above apply fully to targeting in the cyber context, 
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albeit with a degree of interpretive creativity at times� This article will explain how 
each is resolved with respect to cyber operations� The explanation is designed for 
policy makers and operators who conduct, rely on, approve, or are targeted by 
cyber operations� In the contemporary strategic environment, knowledge of the 
law applicable to cyber warfare is quite simply indispensable�
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART I) 
The threshold question in every targeting operation is whether the international 
humanitarian law rules even apply� IHL comes into play only when there is a 
war—an “armed conflict,” in technical legal parlance� There are two forms of 
armed conflict, international and noninternational�6 The former exists when 
hostilities break out between two or more countries, whereas the latter involves 
hostilities at a fairly high level between an organized armed group and a state 
or between two or more organized armed groups� For example, the use of force 
against Ukraine by Russia clearly created an international armed conflict, where-
as the hostilities between Bashar al-Assad’s forces and those opposing his regime 
in Syria are noninternational in character� Unless one of these two forms of 
armed conflict exists, IHL is inapplicable, in which case human rights norms and 
domestic law serve as the core constraints on the targeting operation in question�
Whenever there is an armed conflict of either sort, IHL governs those cyber 
operations having a nexus with the conflict�7 To take a simple example, it is no less 
a violation of IHL, and no less a war crime, to conduct cyber operations intended 
to kill members of the civilian population than it is to bomb or shell them; the 
same law prohibiting direct attacks on civilians is breached�8 How that IHL rule 
applies is discussed below, but it is incontestable that it applies in its entirety to 
conflict-related cyber operations� 
The somewhat more challenging legal question is whether cyber operations 
alone may qualify as armed conflicts to which IHL applies� In other words, if 
there is no armed conflict in the first place, can one begin as a result of cyber 
operations? The question is essential, because once an armed conflict breaks out, 
it becomes lawful to direct cyber and kinetic strikes against the armed forces and 
military objectives� This is so irrespective of blame for starting the conflict� To 
address this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between international and non-
international armed conflict�
If there are two or more states involved, the first criterion for an international 
armed conflict is met� The second, that “hostilities” have taken place, is somewhat 
ambiguous�9 Two questions present themselves in this regard—one qualitative, 
the other quantitative� First, can cyber exchanges qualify as hostilities, or are they 
of such a unique nature that it is inappropriate to deem them such? It would seem 
logical that cyber operations that are qualitatively “attacks,” as the term is used in 
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IHL, qualify as hostilities in the same way as kinetic attacks� Attacks, as explained 
further below, are operations causing damage or injury� There is no normative or 
practical logic for distinguishing between a cyber operation that damages objects 
or injures people and a kinetic operation with precisely the same effects� 
However, whether cyber operations not qualifying as attacks under IHL 
may initiate an armed conflict remains unsettled� For instance, would cyber 
operations that result in a 
major loss of confidence in 
the stock market—a conse-
quence far more serious than 
minor property damage or 
injury—qualify? As noted by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “it would appear that the 
answer to these questions will probably be determined in a definite manner only 
through future State practice�”10
Second, is there any minimum severity below which an attack, whether kinetic 
or cyber, cannot be considered as having started an international armed conflict? 
The quantitative threshold is unclear in law� It is sometimes argued that, for in-
stance, minor exchanges of fire between the forces of two states do not rise to the 
level of armed conflict� However, a better view is that which has been asserted 
by the ICRC for many years: “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, 
how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces�”11 
This approach is, as lawyers say, more consistent with the “object and purpose” 
of IHL, since a state will want its civilians and civilian objects protected, and at 
the same time it will wish to be able to use lethal or destructive force against the 
other side if hostilities break out� 
Accordingly, an international armed conflict could begin solely on the basis of 
cyber exchanges if two or more states were involved and the nature of the opera-
tions qualified them as attacks� To cite a well-known example, consider the 2010 
Stuxnet operation against Iran� Assuming, solely for the sake of illustration, that 
it was states that conducted the operation, the damage arguably meant that the 
states involved were in an international armed conflict, at least for the period 
during which the damaging acts were under way�12 
Cyber exchanges alone are far less likely to meet the two criteria for nonin-
ternational armed conflict�13 First, the state must be facing an “organized armed 
group�” Although the legal preconditions for qualification as such are rather com-
plicated, in the cyber context the pressing question is whether they are met by a 
group organized entirely online� Organized armed groups have to be in some way 
“commanded,” and some degree of structure must exist that allows their mem-
bers to operate as a unit�14 It is also often suggested that “organization” requires a 
The harsh reality of . . . military cyber activity 
is that the heavy reliance on civilian products 
and infrastructure dramatically expands the 
universe of targetable objects.
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means to enforce IHL within the group�15 It is difficult to see how a virtual group 
whose members may not even know each other’s names or physical locations 
could meet this condition�
Additionally, the group in question must be armed� The logic underlying 
the discussion of international armed conflict would appear useful by analogy� 
“Armed” can be interpreted as a requirement for “hostilities,” which are acts that 
qualify as “attacks�” In this context, therefore, an organized armed group is one 
that conducts kinetic or cyber attacks� Thus, a group that merely conducted non-
destructive denial-of-service operations, for example, would not qualify� This is 
one reason why the operations against Estonia did not rise to the level of a nonin-
ternational armed conflict� Those involved were acting in concert, but they were 
not organized into one or more particular armed groups�
Second, and unlike international armed conflict, the violence associated with 
a noninternational armed conflict must be protracted and must reach a high level 
of severity� It does not include “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature�”16 Even cyber operations causing death or destruction will sometimes not 
suffice� Neither would a single dramatic cyber operation, such as a cyber terrorist 
attack, qualify, even if causing harm far above the level just characterized, because 
that harm would not be protracted� In the simplest terms, the cyber conflict must 
start looking like a war� To turn again to the Estonian case, the hacktivist opera-
tions did not rise to this level because, despite widespread disruption of societal 
functions, there was no physical damage or injury� 
Nonstate-actor cyber operations meeting these demanding criteria are cur-
rently unlikely� A more probable scenario is one in which cyber operations ac-
company kinetic ones and are governed by IHL on that basis� Therefore, when 
nonstate-actor cyber operations occur in isolation from kinetic attacks, they will 
typically be governed by the domestic law of states exercising jurisdiction over 
the persons and particular subject matter involved, as well as by human rights 
law, but not by the IHL norms described below�
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART II)
Once it is determined that an armed conflict to which IHL applies is under way, 
the next step is to determine whether the law of targeting applies to the cyber 
operation in question�17 Doing so is more difficult than might appear at first 
glance� Indeed, the Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the subject for three 
years without reaching full consensus�
Any discussion of targeting begins with the principle of “distinction,” which is 
codified in Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: “The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
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the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military objec-
tives�”18 The United States, though not a party to that instrument, recognizes 
Article 48 as reflective of customary international law, which binds all states�19 
Indeed, the principle is arguably the most important in IHL, one that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has labeled as one of the two “cardinal” principles of IHL�20 
In international law circles, a major debate with particular resonance in the cyber 
context is ongoing regarding whether the principle of distinction rules out all 
operations against objects and persons that do not qualify as military objectives, 
especially civilians and civilian objects� Textually, the article certainly appears to 
say as much, but such a conclusion would be both counterintuitive and ahistori-
cal� After all, military operations, such as psychological operations, have been 
directed against civilian populations for centuries�
A closer look into Additional Protocol I reveals a series of prohibitions and 
restrictions on “attack” that operationalize the principle: attacks against civilians 
and civilian objects are prohibited, indiscriminate attacks are forbidden, parties 
to a conflict must take precautions to minimize civilian harm when planning 
and conducting attacks, a defender must take precautions to protect the civilian 
population against the effects of attacks, and so forth�21 Helpfully, “attacks” are 
defined in the protocol as “acts of violence against the enemy, whether in of-
fence or defence�”22 The characterization of an attack as a violent act is repeated 
throughout the treaty and in ICRC and other commentaries thereon�23 
It would seem, however, that the protocol is inaptly worded� Violent acts are 
of less concern in IHL than are violent consequences� This has been obvious for 
decades, the paradigmatic examples being the prohibitions on chemical, biologi-
cal, and radiological attacks, which are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic 
force but have violent consequences, notably death� By the same logic, a cyber 
operation causing injury to persons or damage to objects is an attack subject to 
all the relevant IHL rules on attacks�24
But controversy surrounds the issue of whether the notion of attacks should be 
interpreted more broadly� A cyber operation targeting civilian cyber infrastruc-
ture (“communications, storage, and computing resources upon which informa-
tion systems operate”) without physical effects could be far more detrimental 
than one causing limited damage�25 Consider an attack during an armed conflict 
on the enemy’s banking, taxation, government pension, or airline reservations 
systems� Critics of a restrictive interpretation argue that it seems incongruent to 
prohibit only operations having physical effects�
Two methods have surfaced that take account of this reality without the neces-
sity of either successfully negotiating new treaty terms (an unlikely eventuality) 
or interpreting the current law in a fashion that renders it unrecognizable� First, 
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there are those who would interpret data as an object, such that an operation that 
manipulated, altered, or deleted civilian data would be prohibited�26 The concep-
tual problem is that the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I describes 
an object as something “tangible,” and data certainly is not that�27 Goal-oriented 
legal academics have proposed creative interpretation as a means of hurdling this 
particular obstacle but fail to offer a viable practical alternative� If data is treated 
as an object, any operation that manipulates civilian data would qualify as “dam-
age” to (alteration of data) or “destruction” of (deletion of data) a “civilian object” 
and would thus be unlawful� As an example, deletion of a civilian’s forum or blog 
post would be a violation of IHL, as would nondestructive psychological cyber 
operations directed at the civilian population� Moreover, such an interpretation 
would dramatically affect application of the rule of proportionality and the re-
quirement to take precautions in attack� Both, as discussed below, extend further 
protection to civilian objects, the former by prohibiting attacks likely to cause 
“excessive” collateral damage to civilian objects, the latter by requiring an at-
tacker to take feasible measures to limit damage to civilian objects�28 International 
humanitarian law is a careful balancing of humanitarian concerns with military 
necessity; simply styling data as an object would throw this balance out of kilter, 
by barring operations that today are considered lawful in both their cyber and 
traditional guises� 
The second approach, and the one adopted by a majority of the experts in-
volved in the Tallinn Manual project, is to include “loss of functionality” in the 
concept of damage�29 On this view, a cyber operation that affects the functional-
ity of cyber infrastructure (from a laptop computer to a SCADA system*) in a 
manner that necessitates repair qualifies as an attack even if no physical damage 
results� This approach makes sense, for it is fair to describe an item as damaged 
when it does not work; it is broken, even though it may not be physically dam-
aged� Among the experts taking this position during the Tallinn Manual project 
there were various shades of opinion� Some were of the view that necessity to 
reload an operating system satisfied the damage criterion� Others went so far as 
to say that cyber operations affecting data stored on the computer’s drives would 
suffice, although this was a minority view� 
The implications of the majority positions set out above are significant� Un-
less a cyber operation has consequences that at least affect the functionality of an 
object, it is not damaged in the IHL sense and the operation does not qualify as an 
attack� Therefore, the operation is not subject to the prohibition on conducting 
* Supervisory control and data acquisition—referring to “computer systems and instrumentation that 
provide for monitoring and controlling industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, such 
as the operation of power plants, water treatment facilities, electrical distribution systems, oil and 
gas pipelines, airports, and factories” (Tallinn Manual, p� 262)�
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attacks against civilian objects� As a result, it is generally legal during an armed 
conflict to conduct cyber operations directed against civilian objects, so long as 
these objects are not physically damaged or do not lose functionality (or some-
how result in injury to civilians)� To illustrate, it would be lawful to conduct 
denial-of-service attacks that blocked civilian e-services such as tax collection 
or the payment of pension benefits but did not harm or affect the functionality 
of the associated cyber infrastructure, at least until the economic consequences 
became so severe that they began to have physical effects, such as starvation or 
illness� Similarly, by the majority approach it would be lawful to alter or destroy 
data so long as no consequences amounting to injury, physical damage, or loss of 
functionality are manifest; examples could include government archives, birth or 
citizenship records, business records, and market returns� Although such opera-
tions might raise serious moral, political, and social issues, they appear lawful 
today�
THE TARGET
Assuming that a cyber operation occurs during an armed conflict and qualifies 
as an attack, the next hurdle is determining whether the target is a lawful one� 
Cyber operations most frequently implicate the prohibition on attacking civilian 
objects� In IHL, civilian objects are defined negatively as “all objects which are 
not military objectives�”30 Military objectives are “objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage�”31 
The equipment and facilities of the armed forces are military objectives by 
nature; a command-and-control facility and cyber infrastructure developed for 
specific military tasks both qualify, for example, on this basis� A particular loca-
tion can also be a military objective, as when cyber means are used to open a 
dam’s gates to flood an area and deny its use to the enemy� Aside from military 
equipment, the most likely military objective in the cyber context is an object 
that qualifies by the “use” criterion—that is, one that was formerly or is still being 
used for civilian purposes but is now being employed, at least in part, for military 
ends� It should be cautioned that a rule of reason holds when applying this crite-
rion to cyber activities� For instance, the mere fact that the military sends e-mail 
over the Internet does not render the entire Internet a lawful target� Finally, a 
civilian object can become a military objective through “purpose,” which refers to 
the intended future use of an object� For example, if there is reliable intelligence 
that a civilian server farm will soon begin to store military data, the farm is a 
military objective that may be attacked even before data storage begins�
Book 1.indb   18 2/4/15   10:24 AM
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
 S C H M I T T  1 9
These definitions do not present any particular problems in the cyber setting� 
However, it must be acknowledged that the pervasive use of civilian cyber infra-
structure for military purposes has transformed much of it into the character of 
valid military objectives� When an object is used for both civilian and military 
purposes, it is labeled “dual 
use�” In targeting terms, the 
term applies whether some-
thing is exclusively used for 
military purposes, is shared 
by civilian and military users, 
or is only used to a limited degree by the military—it qualifies as a targetable mili-
tary objective� The civilian aspects of the target are relevant to the requirements 
for proportionality and precautions in attack as described below, but civilian use 
does not diminish its qualification as a military objective�
To take a simple example, many air-traffic-control and airspace-management 
systems serve both civilian and military aircraft� When this is the case, they are 
military objectives irrespective of the extent of civilian reliance on them� The 
communications lines to which the systems are connected are also dual-use and 
so too qualify as military objectives, as do any routers involved and any servers 
on which their data is stored� The harsh reality of twenty-first-century military 
cyber activity is that the heavy reliance on civilian products and infrastructure 
dramatically expands the universe of targetable objects, including systems on 
which important civilian functions rely�
The introduction of cyber capabilities into contemporary combat has also 
exacerbated a long-standing debate over the very notion of military objectives� 
All states and legal commentators agree that the term encompasses “war fight-
ing” and “war supporting” objects� The former are those used to conduct military 
operations, whereas the latter include objects on which military operations rely 
in some relatively direct sense, such as factories that make munitions, weapons, 
or equipment (including computer equipment) used by the military, even when 
they also produce civilian products� They may not necessarily be attacked, be-
cause of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions, but 
they unquestionably qualify as military objectives� What is especially significant 
with regard to the war-supporting category in the cyber context is the extent to 
which the dependence of the armed forces on civilian products and infrastruc-
ture makes not only the objects in question legally targetable but also the facilities 
that produce them� 
However, a third category, “war sustaining” objects, has generated wide-
spread controversy� The U�S� Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
There is now widespread agreement that 
international humanitarian law applies in its 
entirety to cyber operations conducted during 
an armed conflict.
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Operations, the most current U�S� manual addressing international humanitarian 
law, labels enemy war-sustaining objects as military objectives susceptible to 
lawful attack�32 An annotated version of the previous edition of the handbook 
offers the example of cotton during the American Civil War�33 But for the export 
of cotton, the Confederacy would have been unable to finance its war effort� Cot-
ton exports, then, sustained the war; therefore, according to this approach, that 
industry was lawfully targetable� The contemporary analogue would be those as-
pects of an economy or governmental financial system on which the enemy relies 
to fund participation in the conflict� Obvious examples are the oil industries of 
countries that depend heavily on oil exports for funds; although the United States 
has never developed the concept with any granularity, other examples might also 
include the tax systems, financial systems, transport networks, and the like�
The significance of this approach in its application to the cyber environment 
cannot be overstated� Many war-sustaining targets cannot be struck kinetically 
in a fashion that would generate the same effects as cyber attacks� Consider the 
banking system� While kinetic attacks against banks would be highly disruptive, 
they would be unlikely, given the limitations of kinetic weaponry and the num-
ber of potential targets falling into this category, to create strategic effects on the 
order of undermining the sustainability of the war effort� However, cyber attacks 
that would, for instance, render dysfunctional the cyber infrastructure on which 
the banking system relies could bring the entire system down� The war-sustaining 
debate once loomed large; the ability of cyber operations to make war-sustaining 
attacks possible and effective at the operational and strategic levels will probably 
reinvigorate it� This is especially so in light of the fact that very few states have 
openly embraced the U�S� approach, thereby rendering the world’s most cyber-
empowered military an outlier on the matter� Ironically, the United States is itself 
highly vulnerable to attacks on its own “war sustaining” infrastructure, thereby 
raising the question whether its interpretation is ill-advised when applied to the 
cyber context�
In addition to objects, “persons” may qualify as lawful targets� It is, of course, 
possible to attack people by cyber means—for instance, by starting fires in facili-
ties in which they are located, interfering with air-traffic control relied on by the 
aircraft transporting them, causing train collisions, and so forth� Additionally, 
individuals involved in cyber operations may be targeted kinetically once they 
have been identified and located� The issues are which people are targetable, as a 
matter of law, and when they may be targeted�
Obviously, members of the armed forces who conduct cyber operations are 
always targetable (unless hors de combat); they are combatants�34 The rules re-
garding when civilians may be targeted are far more complex� To address this, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a five-year (between 
Book 1.indb   20 2/4/15   10:24 AM
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
 S C H M I T T  2 1
2003 and 2008) research study involving a group of forty international experts�35 
The experts agreed that members of an organized armed group, as defined above, 
are targetable while they are members of the group�36 They disagreed, however, 
over precisely which members of the group were targetable� The ICRC was of the 
position that only those with a “continuous combat function” could be attacked� 
Such functions encompass roles in the group that involve activities likely to affect 
the enemy adversely�37 Some individual participants in the project, including the 
author, countered that all members of a group formed to conduct hostilities (or 
the members of the armed wing of a group that includes other functions, such 
as Hamas) could be attacked, a position that appears to be favored by the United 
States, Israel, and other countries with significant combat experience�38
Applied to cyber, the approaches taken to direct participation lead in different 
directions� Take an organized armed group that conducts kinetic hostilities but 
also has “cyber operators�” All those who conduct cyber operations against the 
enemy or who defend against the enemy’s operations have continuous combat 
functions and therefore would be targetable by either approach� Other members 
may have such cyber-related duties as maintaining propaganda websites or re-
cruiting members� By the ICRC approach, they do not have continuous combat 
functions and therefore would not be targetable unless they assumed such func-
tions within the group� By the alternative approach, they could be attacked at any 
time, on the basis of their membership in the group�
Individuals unaffiliated with organized armed groups or, in the ICRC ap-
proach, who do not have continuous combat functions in such groups are tar-
getable only “for such time” as they “take a direct part in hostilities�”39 An act 
amounts to direct participation when it meets three criteria�40 First, it must either 
adversely affect the military operations or military capability of one of the parties 
to the conflict or injure or damage persons or objects protected by IHL, such as 
civilians and civilian objects�41 It is important to understand that this criterion 
does not require that the activity qualify as an attack� As an example, gathering 
and disseminating tactical- and operational-level intelligence by cyber means 
suffices, as would probing enemy systems to identify vulnerabilities� 
Second, the qualifying activity must directly cause the harm or be an integral 
component of the operation that does so�42 There has been some controversy over 
this requirement with respect to the production of improvised explosive devices 
and services as voluntary human shields� Although both activities are sometimes 
characterized as indirect, the better position is that causal nexus between such 
activities and harm to the enemy is sufficiently direct�43 The cyber analogue 
would be developing software specific to an attack on the enemy system or al-
lowing cyber operations to be launched from one’s home or business by others� 
One thing on which all parties agree is that factory workers do not qualify as 
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direct participants in hostilities� This being so, individuals involved in the general 
production of cyber infrastructure and equipment or in its general (as distinct 
from operational) maintenance are not targetable direct participants, although 
the facilities in which they operate qualify as military targets by virtue of their use�
The third requirement is that there be a nexus between the activity and the 
conflict�44 In other words, the activity must be related to the ongoing conflict, as 
distinct from being an act of criminality or mere maliciousness� Although the 
facts of particular cases are sometimes difficult to discern, experts are in accord 
on this criterion�
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the direct-participation rules in 
the cyber context� The Georgia-Russia armed conflict, as well as subsequent ones, 
demonstrates that the civilian 
population is highly likely to 
become involved in the cyber 
aspects of the conflict� For 
instance, in the Georgia case a 
website (StopGeorgia�ru) containing cyber targets and downloadable “malware” 
(malicious software) necessary to conduct cyber operations appeared online 
soon after the launch of kinetic operations�45 The site proved effective in enabling 
cyber operations by civilians against Georgian military and civilian cyber targets� 
As this example illustrates, it is far easier to “cyber arm” a civilian population 
than to arm it with traditional weaponry� Additionally, many individuals have 
the know-how to conduct harmful cyber operations; all they require to begin 
participating in the hostilities is connectivity� 
To compound matters, the scope of activities constituting direct participation 
in hostilities is broad� Conducting a simple denial-of-service operation, building 
a botnet* for use against the enemy, or texting to report visual sightings of enemy 
forces would all qualify as direct participation that justifies lethally attacking the 
civilian involved� As should be apparent, the direct-participation rule could make 
the pool of targetable individuals extremely large in future conflicts, far more 
than is the case in classic conflict� 
That said, one possible obstacle to far-reaching application of the rule is that 
a direct participant is targetable only “for such time” as he or she is so participat-
ing�46 The ICRC has suggested that this period includes measures preparatory 
to specific acts of direct participation, as well as deployment to and return from 
the activity concerned�47 This is a rather impractical standard in the cyber con-
text� Except for close-access operations (those involving in-person manipula-
tion of cyber infrastructure), there is usually no deployment to and from cyber 
* “A network of compromised computers, the ‘bots,’ remotely controlled by the intruder, ‘the 
botherder,’ used to conduct coordinated [malicious] cyber operations” (Tallinn Manual, p� 257)�
To borrow a sports analogy, a team that takes 
the field without knowing the rules is usually 
going to lose, even if it is the better team.
Book 1.indb   22 2/4/15   10:24 AM
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
 S C H M I T T  2 3
operations; they are conducted remotely� Thus, by the ICRC approach, the direct 
participant would have to be caught in the act, a standard that dramatically nar-
rows the window of targetability� Further rendering this position impracticable 
is the fact that cyber operations can be very brief, sometimes so brief that an 
attacker cannot be identified to a level of reasonable confidence before the opera-
tion is over� Therefore, the better approach is to characterize an individual who 
engages in multiple cyber operations that are part of an ongoing cyber campaign 
as a direct participant targetable throughout the period of activity� Once indi-
viduals definitively withdraw from participation, they regain their protection 
from attack, but not before�48 
THE WEAPON 
While certain uses of cyber weapons (destructive or injurious malware), such as 
“attacking” civilians, violate IHL, cyber weapons may also be unlawful per se—
that is, irrespective of actual use� The prohibition most relevant in this regard is 
that on indiscriminate means (weapons)�49 Weapons are prohibited when they ei-
ther cannot be directed at a specific military objective or generate uncontrollable 
effects� In both cases, the weapons are indiscriminate in the sense that they are 
incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or between civilian 
objects and military objectives� The paradigmatic example of the former is the 
V-2 rocket used during World War II, which had a guidance system so rudimen-
tary that the rocket could not be reliably aimed at individual military objectives� 
Biological contagions illustrate the latter, because an attacker employing them 
cannot control their spread from human to human� 
Cyber weapons may at times run afoul of these prohibitions� For example, 
consider malware intended for use against military cyber infrastructure linked to 
civilian networks� If the malware is designed to spread randomly throughout the 
system into which it is introduced, it is indiscriminate by nature and prohibited 
per se� Similarly, malware developed for placement on a website that is open to 
civilians and combatants alike would qualify as indiscriminate irrespective of 
any desire on the part of its user to affect only military systems� Perhaps the best-
known indiscriminate cyber weapon is a malicious but seemingly innocuous e-
mail attachment sent to a combatant’s private e-mail account� Since the attacker 
has no control over to whom it might be forwarded, the e-mail, depending on 
its apparent nature (e�g�, a humorous e-mail likely to be forwarded), would be 
indiscriminate� 
It must be cautioned that the restrictions on indiscriminate weapons apply 
only when the cyber weapon in question is designed to conduct attacks� They do 
not bear on malware that does not cause injury, damage, or loss of system func-
tionality� For instance, an e-mail attachment that when opened simply enables 
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future access by the sender would not be unlawful under IHL, even though the 
sender might not be able to control its further spread into civilian systems�
Because of this, as well as the fact that advanced cyber weapons likely to be 
used by states in armed conflict are by their nature designed to exploit particular 
vulnerabilities in specific systems, few cyber weapons violate the prohibition on 
indiscriminate weapons� For example, bespoke cyber weapons can be employed 
against closed military systems in which the risk of bleed-over into civilian 
networks is low� Of course, there is always some risk of unintentional or unan-
ticipated migration into civilian systems, as illustrated by the Stuxnet malware, 
which, contrary to the intent of its designers, escaped the nuclear enrichment 
plant that had been targeted� Yet the risk of malfunction or unanticipated effects 
is a pervasive feature of weaponry writ large; only when the weapon is incapable 
of being aimed or controlled is it prohibited as indiscriminate�
PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID CIVILIAN HARM
Even when employing a lawful cyber weapon against a lawful target, an attacker 
must take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects�”50 To this end the law specifies a number of precautionary measures� The 
attacker must do everything feasible to verify that the target is not protected by 
IHL;51 must select the weapon, tactic, and target that will minimize civilian harm 
without forfeiting military advantage;52 must cancel or suspend an attack when 
reason to believe that the attack may be unlawful comes to light;53 and must warn 
the civilian population of any attack that may affect it, unless doing so would not 
be feasible in the circumstances�54
Cyber capabilities raise a number of issues in this regard� They can, for exam-
ple, be used to gather target information� If doing so would improve knowledge 
of the target’s legal status (and if it is militarily feasible in the circumstances, given 
such factors as attack timing and competing demands on the cyber asset), the 
attacker must undertake the effort� Cyber operations may also provide a means 
of issuing warnings to the civilian population of both cyber and kinetic attack� 
For instance, general warnings of attack could be transmitted through civilian 
systems networked to military cyber infrastructure urging measures to be taken 
to safeguard them from the effects of attack on the military objectives�
However, the most significant impact of the precautions-in-attack rules lies in 
the requirement to consider alternative weapons, tactics, and targets to minimize 
civilian incidental harm� To illustrate, it may be possible to neutralize an integrat-
ed air-defense system by cyber means instead of by conducting kinetic attacks 
against its assorted components� Since cyber operations would in most cases be 
less likely to cause collateral damage, they would be required by law in lieu of 
kinetic alternatives, if their employment is feasible and militarily sensible� Cyber 
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operations may also open the possibility of striking different targets to achieve a 
desired effect� As an example, to disrupt enemy operations it may be possible to 
use cyber assets against communications infrastructure serving a command-and-
control facility located near civilians, rather than attacking the facility itself, and 
achieve precisely the desired effect� Indeed, it could prove useful to preserve the 
facility to exploit it subsequently by using cyber means to transmit false instruc-
tions and other information to the enemy forces�
It must be emphasized that the precautions-in-attack rule regarding selection 
of weapons, tactics, and targets is obligatory� If cyber means are reasonably avail-
able, their use makes military sense in the circumstances, and their employment 
would not diminish the likelihood of operational success, the attacking force 
must use them� Failure to do so will violate the law� It is accordingly prudent for 
those who plan, approve, and execute military operations to have ready access to 
cyber expertise that can apprise them of cyber options� Ignorance is not an excuse 
for failure to comply with the rule in situations where the individual concerned 
should have known that a cyber operation was feasible in the circumstances and 
would likely have resulted in less collateral damage�
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Once the attacker has surveyed the range of possible operations to achieve the 
desired effects and selected that viable alternative that best minimizes collateral 
damage, the operation is assessed against the rule of proportionality� This rule 
provides that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated” is prohibited�55 
Two mistakes have proved common in application of the rule of proportional-
ity� First, the rule is often mischaracterized as a balancing test in which military 
advantage and collateral damage are somehow accorded values that presumably 
can be compared� Not only is it difficult to imagine how this could be done in 
practice, but portraying proportionality as a balancing test runs counter to the 
plain text of the rule, which precludes an attack only when the collateral damage 
is “excessive�” “Excessive” refers to a “significant imbalance,” one in which it is rea-
sonably clear that causing the expected degree of collateral damage is not justified 
by the military advantage the attacker hopes to attain�56 Since cyber operations 
can generate effects that are not typically present in warfare and are therefore 
somewhat unfamiliar, fidelity to the “excessive” standard is essential, as it affords 
the attacker the correct degree of discretion�
Second, the rule is unfortunately often applied post factum� However, as is 
clear from its text, the proportionality assessment is made ex ante (i�e�, at the 
Book 1.indb   25 2/4/15   10:24 AM
15
Schmitt: The Law of Cyber Targeting
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 2 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
outset)� Expected collateral damage is assessed against the anticipated military 
advantage� The actual collateral damage caused and the military advantage that 
actually results are relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the attacker’s pre-
attack proportionality assessment but are not dispositive of whether the attacker 
has satisfied the rule of proportionality� This is again an important point in the 
cyber context, because of the widespread linkage of civilian and military systems 
and the difficulty an attacker may face in evaluating potential effects at the time 
the cyber mission is planned, 
approved, or executed� 
With respect to the sub-
stantive aspects of propor-
tionality, cyber operations can 
serve to minimize collateral 
damage and therefore make compliance with the rule more likely� The networked 
nature of cyber infrastructure, however, heightens the risk of indirect effects on 
civilian systems� This is particularly true in light of the wide-ranging reliance of 
some militaries on dual-use cyber systems� To the extent to which indirect effects 
are foreseeable, they must be considered when making proportionality calcula-
tions� That said, the proportionality rule, like the prohibition on weapons gen-
erating uncontrollable effects, requires the consideration only of “loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians,” and “damage to civilian objects�” Other, indirect effects 
of a cyber operation on civilians, civilian objects, and other persons and objects 
protected by IHL are not factored into the equation�
Cyber operations appeared on the battlefield in a dangerous interpretive void� 
As so often happens, technology has outpaced the law, or at least in this case 
full understanding of how extant law governs emerging cyber capabilities� Such 
a state of affairs is always strategically perilous� On the one hand, options that 
are in fact lawful are sometimes needlessly taken off the table out of misguided 
concern about their legality� On the other, unlawful options are at times seriously 
considered, thereby risking public and international condemnation should they 
be selected�
The normative fog of cyber war is beginning to clear, albeit slowly� This ar-
ticle has surveyed those aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to 
targeting, the activity during an armed conflict that poses the greatest risk to the 
defender and the civilian population� But targeting equally poses the greatest 
risk to the attacker, not only from an operational perspective, but also in terms 
of mission accomplishment� Characterization of a cyber operation as unlawful 
can quickly wipe away any gains that the operation has attained� It is accordingly 
essential that those occupying roles having responsibility for overseeing and 
Cyber activities have become an indelible 
facet of contemporary warfare, not just for 
cyber-empowered militaries such as that of the 
United States, but also for low-tech forces.
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executing cyber operations develop a degree of understanding of their normative 
boundaries. 
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